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CAIB

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
Executive Summary (excerpt)
“The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space
Shuttle Program’s history and culture, including the original
compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle,
subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities,
schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as
operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed
national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and
organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to
develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for
sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why
systems were not performing in accordance with requirements);
organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of
critical safety information and stifled professional differences of
opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements;
and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision
making processes that operated outside the organization’s rules.”
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Space Shuttle Program History and Culture
■ Original compromises
■ Resource constraints
■ Fluctuating priorities
■ Schedule pressure
■ Calling Shuttle Operational
versus Developmental
■ Lack of a National Vision for
Human Space Flight
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Cultural Traits and Organizational Practices
■Reliance on past success
■Lack of testing to understand system
performance
■Stifled professional differences of opinion that
prevented communication
■Lack of integrated management across
Program Elements
■Evolution of an Informal Chain of Command
allowing for decision-making outside of the
formal process
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SETTING THE STAGE

■ Challenger Accident Backdrop
– Temperature at launch: 36 degrees Fahrenheit
– Launch postponed three times and scrubbed once from
original planned date of January 22, 1986
– First teacher in space
– State of the Union address scheduled evening of launch
■ Columbia Accident Backdrop
– 16-day mission included 80+ science experiments
– Successful launch
• “Typical” foam insulation shedding from external tank
showed up on launch footage
– Mission going well on-orbit; Mission
Management Team elects not to meet daily
– Heading into a 3-day
Holiday weekend
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Challenger Fast Facts
Launch Date: January 28, 1986,
11:38 a.m. EST
Accident: 73 seconds after launch
Orbiter: Challenger (OV-099) - 10th
mission
STS-51L: 25th Space Shuttle Flight
Columbia Fast Facts
Launch Date: January 16, 2003,
10:39 a.m. EST
Accident: February 1, 2003, 9 a.m.
EST - Columbia and crew lost
during reentry over East Texas 16
minutes prior to planned landing
at KSC
Orbiter: Columbia (OV-102) - 27th
mission
Oldest Orbiter in the fleet (STS-1 in
April 1981)
STS-107: 113th Space Shuttle Flight

LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Leadership issues that contributed to each accident were very similar

“Based on NASAʼs history of ignoring external recommendations, or making
improvements that atrophy with time, the Board has no confidence that the Space
Shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely on renewed
post-accident vigilance.” (Source: CAIB Report, Vol. I, Aug. 2003, page. 13.)

Schedule vs Safety as a Priority
■ Challenger
NASA published a projection in 1985 calling for an annual rate of 24 flights per year by
1990, which drove pressure to hold launch date in spite of weather conditions outside
of Launch Limit Criteria
■ Columbia
Didn’t want to impact planned on-orbit mission objectives/science
experiments by adding requirements for tile inspection Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) or external imagery support

LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Normalization of Deviance
■ Challenger
– O-Ring Unexplained Anomalies (UA) from previous flights
■ Columbia
– Foam shedding on other missions deemed “typical”

Suppressing vs Encouraging Dissent
■ Challenger
Solid Rocket Booster manufacturer’s Senior Vice President at home plant
overruled Launch Site Chief Engineer and signed Certificate of Flight
Readiness (CoFR)
■ Columbia
Numerous experienced Contractor and NASA personnel expressed
concerns with foam shedding

LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Technical Competence vs Bureaucratic Process
Bureaucratic Decision Processes
■ Challenger
– Decision to launch was flawed. Decision-makers did not take into full account:
• Recent history of problems with O-rings
• Contractor advising against launch with propellant bulk temperatures below
53 degrees Fahrenheit
• Continuing opposition of engineers after management reversed its position
■ Columbia
– A culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of
command, procedure, following the rules, and going by the book.
– While rules and procedures were essential for coordination, they
had an unintended but negative effect
– Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had replaced deference to
engineersʼ technical expertise

LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Enduring Lessons
■ Speak up
■ Dissention has tremendous value
■ Question conventional wisdom
■ Engineering is done with numbers

